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Abstract
There is a paucity of in-depth research on the effects that enterprise resource planning (ERP)
systems have on firm-specific intangible assets, such as firm-specific knowledge and core
capabilities. Accordingly, this paper explores the implementation of SAP in two operational
units of the Boxit Group—a global player in the manufacture of paper and packaging.
Leonard-Barton’s (1995) theory of knowledge creating activities, knowledge sets, and core
and non-core capabilities is employed as a conceptual framework to examine the
implementation and use of SAP modules in the firm studied. The findings of this in-depth
exploratory case study illustrate that the introduction of SAP-specific business routines can
threaten established core, enabling and supplemental capabilities and related knowledge
sets. The integration of SAP’s embedded business routines and reporting functionality
contributed to the creation of (a) highly rigid reporting structures; (b) inflexible managerial
decision-making routines; and (c) reduced autonomy on the factory floor in the firm studied.
SAP thus endangered the firm-specific knowledge creating activities that underpinned core
operational capabilities in this organization. Finally, Leonard-Barton’s conceptual
framework is extended to incorporate insights into the manner in which ERP systems such as
SAP affect the various aspects of organizational knowledge sets.
Keywords
Enterprise Resource Systems, SAP, Firm-Specific Knowledge, Core Capabilities

1. Introduction
Previous research on enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems centers on business
modeling, product development issues, the life cycle of ERP systems, and the knowledge
required to manage the implementation of ERP systems (Esteves and Pastor 2001). Studies of
ERP system implementation and use, which focus on knowledge and its management,
address such issues as (a) change management around ERP system implementation (AlMashhari 2000); (b) senior managers’ perspectives on knowledge management in ERP
environments (Klaus & Gable 2000); (c) knowledge requirements for ERP systems
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implementation and management (Jones and Price 2001); (d) the relationship between ERP,
knowledge and organizational effectiveness (Hedman 2000); and (e) ERP systems and the
integration of knowledge in organization (Esteves & Pastor 2001). There is, nevertheless, a
paucity of research on how ERP systems influence extant knowledge creation activities and
associated core capabilities in organizations.
This lacuna is addressed in the present paper, which deepens the IS field’s understanding of
the relationship between the introduction of ERP systems and the core capabilities of
manufacturing organizations. Leonard-Barton’s (1995) research illustrates that knowledge
creation activities such as problems solving, experimentation, importation of external
expertise, and the introduction of new methodologies and tools underpin the development of
firm-specific knowledge sets. She argues that such knowledge sets give rise to core
capabilities. The following analysis of the ERP literature helps illustrate the relevance of
Leonard-Barton’s theoretical perspective as this study’s conceptual framework.

2. The Promise and Reality of ERP Systems
More and more firms are turning to ERP systems to leverage knowledge assets at all levels in
the organization. So much so, ERP systems have replaced legacy systems in informating and
automating core business processes (Holland, Light. & Kalwalek 1999). This trend is
reflected by Davenport (1998, p. 122) who states that “the business world’s embrace of
enterprise systems may in fact be the most important development in the corporate use of
information technology in the 1990s.” By 1999, a total of 53,000 firms worldwide had
implemented ERP systems (Cerullo & Cerullo 2000). Unlike legacy systems, ERP systems
tend to take the form of customizable software packages. Leading vendors are SAP, Oracle,
Peoplesoft, Baan, and J. D. Edwards, with SAP being the dominant market player. Cooke and
Peterson (1998) illustrate that the principle reasons why firms implement SAP R/3 is to
standardize business processes and support globalization of activities. Despite its popularity,
however, SAP does not have a reputation for being user-friendly (Stedman 1999). For
example, Caldwell and Stein (1998) found that managers at Amaco refused to operate SAP
because they found it to be user-unfriendly. Another drawback concerns customization—
Holsapple and Sena (1999) observe that while software modifications of SAP modules are
possible, they are not recommended. The rationale for this is that organizations implementing
ERP systems wish to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of business processes by
importing best practices embedded in software like SAP (Curran & Ladd 1998, Bancroft
1998). For that reason, firms rarely attempt customization, as less than 5% of the Fortune
1000 companies customized an ERP system to support idiosyncratic business processes
(Davis 1998). Hence, most organizations adapt or reengineer their business processes to
accommodate SAP modules. This has prompted some to argue that the implementation of an
ERP system should be considered a business project rather than an IS project (Shanks, Parr,
Hu, Corbitt, Thanasankit & Sheddon 2000). Davenport (1998) highlights that ERP systems
generate an imperative to establish common business and information technology processes
across diverse functional boundaries in organizations. This has major implications for the
roles and actions of organizational actors (Hanseth & Braa 1998). Furthermore, it has
enormous implications for firm-specific knowledge sets, as researchers in the resource-based
view hold that an organization’s knowledge is embedded in its organizational and managerial
processes, business routines and practices (Leonard-Barton 1995).
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Figure 1 Foundations of Leonard Barton's Theory of Knowledge Creating Activities,
Knowledge Sets, Core Rigidities and Capabilities
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3. A Framework for Building Organizational
Knowledge Sets and Core Capabilities
Leonard-Barton (1995) argues that a firm’s core capabilities arise out of its knowledge
creating activities. In articulating her theory, Leonard-Barton integrates several theoretical
perspectives with her own empirical research: Figure 1 indicates the related disciplines,
theories and research streams that she draws upon to build her conceptual framework.
Leonard-Barton’s theory of firm-specific competencies posits three types of organizational
capability viz. core, enabling and supplemental (See Figure 2). She argues that core
capabilities provide a firm with a sustainable competitive advantage; hence, they are
distinguished from supplemental and enabling capabilities. Leonard-Barton conceptualizes a
core capability as a firm-specific knowledge set, this, she argues, is reflected in a firm’s
values and norms, physical technical systems, employee knowledge and skills, and
managerial systems. Figure 3 captures these four dimensions to firm-specific knowledge sets.

Core Capability
“ is a knowledge set that distinguishes
and provides a competitive

High

advantage.”
(1992, p. 113)
Enabling Capabilities
“..are necessary but not sufficient in themselves to
competitively distinguish a company”

Degree of
Strategic
Importance

(1995, p. 4)
Supplemental Capabilities
“… add value to core capabilities but that could be imitated - for
example particular distribution channels or strong but not unique
packaging design skills”

(1995, p. 4)

Low

Figure 2 A Taxonomy of Capabilities: Core, Enabling and Supplemental (Adapted from
research by Leonard-Barton)

With some notable exceptions (e.g., Barney 1986), the influence of values and norms are not
usually associated with the creation of core capabilities. Leonard-Barton (1995) illustrates
that values and norms can be dynamic and positive, or they can act to preserve outmoded
routines and capabilities, contributing to the creation of core rigidities. Leonard Barton
(1992) argues that core rigidities are essentially redundant and inefficient organizational
practices and routines. These are shaped by dysfunctional values and norms that fail to
evolve and to meet the challenges in a dynamic and changing environment. Hence,
dysfunctional values and norms are argued to constrain the development of new knowledge
sets and associated productive capabilities. Nevertheless, Leonard-Barton (1995) argues that
dynamic knowledge creating activities counter the problem of core rigidities by ensuring that
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new knowledge circulates, in so doing, revitalizes firms and the communities-of-practice that
constitute them. Figure 4 presents a model of the knowledge creating activities that underpin
the development of firm-specific knowledge in the each of the dimensions to an
organization’s knowledge set. As with extant perspectives on the resource-based view of the
firm, Leonard-Barton highlights the role that problem solving, experimentation, importing
expertise from outside the firm, and implementing and integrating new methodologies plays
in shaping a firm’s knowledge set by acting on all four of the dimensions previously
delineated.

Technological competence
accumulates not only in the
heads of people; it also
accumulates in the physical
systems that they build over
time – databases, machinery,
and software programs
(Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 19)

[T]hese determine what kinds of knowledge are
sought and nurtured, what kinds of knowledgebuilding activities are tolerated and encouraged.
There are systems of caste and status, rituals of
behaviour, and passionate beliefs associated with
various kinds of technological knowledge that are
as rigid and as complex as those associated with
religion. Therefore, values serve as knowledgescreening and control mechanisms (LeonardBarton , 1995, p. 19)

Values and Norms

Physical Technical Systems

Knowledge
Creating
Activities

[T]his skills/knowledge dimension
encompasses both techniques
specific to the firm and scientific
[public] understanding (LeonardBarton, 1995, p. 20)

Knowledge Sets

Capabilities

Managerial systems

Employee Knowledge and
Skill

[O]rganized routine guiding
resource accumulation and
deployment (Leonard-Barton,
1995, p.22)

Figure 3 Values and Norms, Physical Technical Systems, Employee Knowledge and Skills,
and Managerial Systems as Firm-Specific KnowledgeSets
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3.1 Research Objective
This study’s objective is to explore the organizational consequences and outcomes of
importing ‘best practice’ embedded in ERP systems, such as SAP, as non firm-specific
organizational routines. Of special interest is the organizational ability to maintain successful
knowledge creating activities and knowledge sets relevant to its core capabilities, while at
the same time, overcoming potential core rigidities. Formally stated, this study’s research
objective is:
To deepen the IS field’s understanding of SAP’s influence on firm-specific knowledge
creating activities, knowledge sets, and associated core, enabling and supplemental
capabilities through the importation and implementation of non-firm specific routines,
embodying industry-wide best practice.
Leonard-Barton’s (1992, 1995) theory of knowledge creating activities and the resultant
knowledge sets that underpin core, enabling and supplemental capabilities is used as
conceptual framework to structure the case report and its findings. This operates to direct
attention on the operational core capabilities, knowledge creating activities, and knowledge
sets in order to evaluate the affect that SAP has on each.

Shared, creative problem
solving (to produce current
products)

Formal and informal
experimentation (to build
capabilities for the future)

Knowledge
Creating
Activities

Implementing and
integrating new
methodologies and tools (to
enhance internal operations)

Importation of Expertise

Figure 4 Knowledge Creating Activities (Adapted from Leonard-Barton 1995)

4. A Case-based Research Strategy
A naturalistic research approach was adopted for the present study. Accordingly, a
qualitative, interpretive, case-based research strategy was implemented with reference to
constructivist thought in the social sciences (see Lincoln & Guba 1985, Stake 1995) and
interpretivist approaches in the IS field (Walsham 1995). Stake (1995) contends that case
studies can be intrinsic, instrumental, or collective in focus. An instrumental case study is
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one where the case forms a backdrop or context and is of secondary importance. Such a study
is undertaken to validate a theory or to explore a particular phenomenon as it is manifested in
the case. Yin (1994, p. 42) argues that a case may “involve more than one unit of analysis …
such as meetings, roles, or locations,” this he terms an “embedded case study design.” The
present study incorporates an instrumental case study incorporating two embedded units of
analysis.
The case selected for study is the Boxit Group, an Irish owned and managed transnational
corporation specializing in the manufacture of packing cases and associated materials. Boxit
Group and its affiliates employ over 43,000 people in 23 countries worldwide. Two
production facilities constitute the embedded units of analysis—Boxit Corrugated Cases
(BCC) and Boxit Corrugated Services (BCS). The embedded units were purposively selected
because they posses different operational core capabilities, knowledge sets and knowledge
creating activities, and were in different stages of development—BCC was established in
1973 and BCS in 1998. Both participated in the roll-out of the corporate ERP system, which
involved the implementation of SAP’s Financial and Purchasing modules—the latter of
which included support for the engineering maintenance of production equipment at both
plants.
Purposeful sampling was employed throughout. Research was conducted in 2001 at two sites.
Twenty social actors participated in the study, through formal and informal interviews over a
period of several months. Each of the formal interviews was tape-recorded, while extensive
case notes were taken on informal conversations and observations while on-site at the
research locations. A wealth of documentary evidence was also gathered. Naturalist
techniques were employed to analyze and report on the research data (see Lincoln & Guba
1985; Stake 1995).

5. Core Operational Capabilities at BCC and BCS
The Boxit Corrugated Cases (BCC) manufacturing plant supplies the dairy and food sectors
with packaging materials. The packaging requirements of such customers are easily projected
and facilitate large production runs by BCC with minimum change in its standard operational
routines. The emergence of a dynamic and highly successful electronics industry in Ireland
during the early 1990s presented new market opportunities for the Boxit Group. Firms in this
emergent sector had radically different, more sophisticated, and varied packaging
requirements than those of BCC’s traditional customer base. While exciting new
opportunities were presented, so too were possible negative consequences associated with the
dynamic, market-led production schedules and idiosyncratic needs of the electronics
industry. This arose because firms operating in the electronics sector could not provide
suppliers with the exact delivery schedules. Suppliers had to respond quickly, and on short
notice. However, the production capabilities of BCC were not aligned with the needs of firms
operating in the electronics industry, as BCC’s Customer Services Manger pointed out that:
…customers’ requirements [in the electronics sector] range from pallets to foam inserts to
cartons—this is not BCC’s core business and is not cost effective for us to engage in this
work.
BCC’s core capabilities were de facto core rigidities when it came to servicing the
requirements of the electronic industry, while altering values and norms in the company.
After several unsuccessful attempts to reconfigure its production routines, BCC’s
management considered that smaller production runs and products with non-standard
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specifications were too disruptive to the efficient operation of the plant. Thus, due to the need
to maintain its lucrative revenue flows from existing markets, management at BCC were
unable and unwilling to adapt its production activities to service the electronics market. The
choice was clear to BCC, cede the new niche market to other companies, or establish a
production facility with core production capabilities to deliver the product and service in a
way that met customer’s requirements. Hence, Boxit Corrugated Services (BCS) was
established to service the packaging needs of the dynamic electronics industry.
While the BCC was unable to reconfigure its asset and capability portfolios to meet the
dynamic demands of the electronics sector, it did possess a tradition of introducing technical
innovation in its production processes through the knowledge creation activities of its
employees, coupled with the introduction of new technology. For example, BCC pioneered
the process of four-colour printing on corrugated packaging. Consequently, it was five to ten
years ahead of the competition in terms of its technical capabilities. Evidence of this firmspecific ‘knowledge set’ comes from BCC’s Production Manager:
[Competitors] cannot get the same print quality from the four-colour machines, despite
having very good machinery. The difference is down to skills. They have four-colour
machines in Lurgan and Dublin and they cannot produce the same quality as we can in
[BCC]. They would have broadly the same machines, so it’s down to skills.
BCC’s management was aware that capability-based advantages erode over time; hence, it
upgraded production equipment on a regular basis. Significantly, the installation, operation,
and customization of new technology provided a platform for knowledge creation and
capability development, as the production manager commented:
In the past, operators quickly mastered the knowledge and skills required to run new
technologies. When a technological investment has matured, in terms of quality and
efficiency of output, we assess our competitors’ positions and when we determine that they
are closing the gap, in terms of quality and output, we invest again.
Thus, BCC coupled learning-by-doing with the experiential knowledge of long serving staff
to produce and retain skills and related knowledge in a tacit form—in the production area this
method of learning was known as Standing-by-Nanny. Group learning was critical here as
production operators worked in teams of four. In this scheme of things, a lead operator
assumed responsibility for training other members of the team. This helped build and
reinforce a team’s norms and values and enabled knowledge and skill transfers. This
approach to mentoring was widely used in all Boxit’s production facilities. A training
manager usually facilitated the process, as management was mindful that success in such
endeavors could not be left to the communication skills of the lead operator. This approach to
organizational learning created a highly idiosyncratic production-oriented knowledge and
skills resource within the Boxit group of companies. Thus knowledge and skills developed
over time through learning-by-doing and was transmitted through socialization within and
between in communities-of-practice.
When the BCS facility was established in 1998 to meet the idiosyncratic needs of the
electronics sector, BCS’ plant manager opted not replicate BCC’s operational routines by
transferring workers and work practices from BCC. Thus, BCS did not directly import the
knowledge and skills and associated values and norms of BCC’s workforce. His aim was to
introduce more flexible operational routines that would help BCS to meet the particular
needs of the electronics sector; to achieve this, he felt that a radically different set of values
and norms needed to be established in the new plant—values and norms that were congruent
with the use of emergent technologies, like SAP. By so doing, he wished to avoid introducing
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rigidities associated with outdated conditions of employment, including, for example, pay
differentials and demarcation. He clearly recognized that this might prevent the attainment of
flexibility in the manufacturing process deemed to be critical to the success of BCS.
Nevertheless, the knowledge and skills of workers at BCC were recognized as being valuable
to the new operation at BCS. The problem was how to import much-needed knowledge and
skills while filtering out the rigidities and inappropriate knowledge sets associated with the
managerial systems, values and norms at BCC. Accordingly, BCS’ new plant manager
decided to use technology to import the required experiential knowledge and skills while, at
the same time, instituting a different set of values and norms through the process of
socialization. However, his first task was to install the production plant. This had been
sourced from BCC, which was in the process of upgrading its production facilities. In order
to operate the machines, workers had to adopt appropriate operational routines: this
constituted the importation of explicit knowledge and skills from BCC. The importation of
tacit knowledge proved difficult to address, however explicit knowledge of efficiency levels,
quality parameters, and maintenance routines proved easier to import. A task made all the
easier when SAP was introduced, as these were eventually programmed into SAP’s
purchasing module.
While the forgoing describes operational routines at both plants, an understanding of the
forces underpinning managerial decision-making is also important. Before the introduction of
SAP, Boxit Group’s general management philosophy ensured that operational managers had
significant autonomy to run their logistics, production and marketing activities with respect
to local conditions. Boxit found that this strategy helped develop strong local management
teams who understood, and were responsive to, the fluctuations in demand for the products
produced in their plants. Regional manufacturing and sales operations were monitored and
controlled by Boxit’s corporate management team through a system of regular financial
reporting and review, coupled with tight capital and operating expense controls. This regional
decentralization and close central monitoring coupled with performance related incentives for
local managers provided motivation for improvements in performance. The implementation
of SAP changed both the reporting structure and the way in which the organization measures
and improves performance at plant level.

6. The Implementation of SAP and its Effect on Core
Capabilities, Knowledge Sets and Knowledge
Creating Activities
As with most organizations that introduce SAP, Boxit’s corporate management employed a
firm of consultants to help implement the system—this constituted an importation of
expertise. However, Boxit’s management considered that it was necessary for consultants to
be familiar with its industry and culture, if they were to leverage fully their knowledge and
skills. Hence, Boxit attempted to train the consultants in its business routines and inculcate
them in its values and norms. This proved unproductive and expensive, consequently Boxit’s
IT Function opted to train selected end-users to the level of SAP super-users. The rationale
behind this was to have super-users provide one-on-one training to other staff, thereby
increasing the skill level and commitment of end-users. Managers noted that super-users had
developed a valuable and unique knowledge set. They understood Boxit’s business
processes, industry dynamics, and the capabilities of SAP. The role of the super-user evolved
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to one of redesigning the way in which staff implemented business routines and integrating
SAP’s routines with the ‘Boxit way’.

6.1 An Examination of SAP’s Influence on Operational
Capabilities at Boxit
One of Boxit’s primary goals was to use SAP to standardize the performance of each of its
manufacturing plants. As the Human Resource Manager notes:
[W]e have identified approximately 25 key performance criteria for our plants. If we could
transpose the average of the top ten across all firms then our bottom line would be
transformed.
While recognizing that each manufacturing plant has its own values and norms, the HR
manager expected that SAP would help to define the appropriate mix of resources to ensure
that plants improved their performance, as measured by these key performance indicators.
Hence, through SAP, production output from the same make and model of machine operating
in production plants in different locations were compared and analyzed for efficiencies.
Performance that varied from the accepted norm was the subject of remedial action. Once the
best practice was identified, it was adapted and applied to all of the firm’s operations. SAP
therefore facilitated the identification of ‘slacks’ through benchmarking of activities.
However, the managers of individual plants argued that such ‘slacks’ were beneficial for
competence development.
The implementation of SAP provided Boxit’s management with an opportunity to attempt
operational change in structure and process in several areas, as the IT manager pointed out:
[W]e have seen a major change in the structure of the organization since SAP has been
introduced. For the first time in the corporation’s history a senior vice president with
responsibility for purchasing was appointed.
The information SAP provided enabled the Senior Vice President to negotiate the purchase of
raw materials, such as starch, in bulk for Boxit’s entire European operation. The savings
were significant at corporate level, but centralized purchasing prevented plant managers from
sourcing raw materials locally, thereby introducing time efficiencies and cost savings at the
plant level. Thus, they felt that SAP prevented them from lowering the overall cost of
production at their plants. Worse still, according to the plant managers, SAP’s dynamic
reporting capability enabled corporate management to make ad hoc inquires and to drill
down and examine performance in greater detail than ever before. As a manager of BCS
explained:
Now the theory is that we will all run on SAP…from a sheet plant point of view SAP is a
nightmare, I mean it is an enormous amount of work for no benefits at all. In fact it adds cost
to the operation here. For a corrugated plant it has obvious benefits, for an accountant
sitting in Paris it is brilliant because he can see everything and he can drill-down into any
level of detail he wants, down to what machines are producing what. Obviously, this leaves
comparison wide open.
Local managers were concerned that variances attributable to fluctuations in local demand
were not understood at corporate headquarters. Analyzing performance using limited criteria,
they argue, risked producing misleading results; especially if SAP’s non-firm specific
operational routines were misaligned with local conditions. BCS managers therefore
contended that in order to assess the performance of plants in disparate locations, local
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factors must be taken into account. For example, inventory was sometimes maintained at
high levels due to local agreements with customers, while underutilized production capacity
was often due the seasonal fluctuations in the firm’s customer base. Hence, some plants
might not compare favorably with others serving different customer groupings, or when
compared with the requirements of firms in the same industry operating in different regions.
Managers at BCC and BCS felt that this process might be used as a lever to increase
operating efficiencies irrespective of local contingencies. They also argued that SAP-enabled
benchmarking of units acted as a barrier to innovation.
In order to compare favourably with other units, managers at BCS and BCC were under
pressure to commit their resources to maximize current performance; however, as resources
were finite they were to unable dedicate sufficient ‘slacks’ to help maintain plant-specific
innovation through knowledge creating activities. The temptation for local managers was to
leave their successors allocate the required resources to develop the capabilities necessary to
address future problems and opportunities. Hence, managers underlined that SAP-enabled
benchmarking had to involve more than comparing the costs of a series of activities or
services required to produce the products. Using this criterion, there was no accounting for
intangible resources such as knowledge and skills. Under SAP, this was considered a cost
rather than a learning opportunity. It is long recognized that knowledge redundancy is
essential for the well-being of a learning organization and its knowledge creating activities.
Managers and operational staff at BCS and BCC were of the opinion that SAP endangered
the organizational learning process as it led managers to concentrate on attaining short-term
quantifiable gains, thereby depleting the firm’s ‘wellsprings of knowledge’.

6.2 Transferring Explicit Knowledge and Operational Skills
Through SAP
Attitudes toward SAP varied, however, BCC’s production manager identified that it had the
potential to solve problems that were emerging in the workforce by educating technicians as
they performed their duties. When experience maintenance technicians found solutions to
problems with manufacturing equipment, they recorded them using the facility supplied by
SAP. Thus SAP permitted the explicit experiential knowledge of technicians to be captured
and transferred to less-experienced co-workers. This was seen as supporting Boxit’s
learning-by-doing philosophy—except in this case ‘Standing-by-Nanny’ was effectively
augmented by a ‘Standing-by-SAP’ approach. SAP’s capabilities in effecting knowledge
transfers were reported by the BCC’s production manager viz.
We [were] starting to lose maintenance personnel [to other companies] and the information
which the [SAP] system provide[d] help[ed] new maintenance personnel, who ha[d] no
experience of working with packaging equipment. The information on the system provide[d]
points of reference to help technicians to diagnose and rectify problems. Consequently, each
technician [was] aware of work previously undertaken on each machine.
Ironically, the manager at BCS, who later was highly critical of SAP, exploited this facility
early on to help transfer explicit knowledge of the operation and maintenance of former BCC
plant to BCS, thus avoiding the importation of what were operational core rigidities at BCC.
Nevertheless, the maintenance community perceived the introduction of SAP as an additional
method of supervision and quality control. They objected to the implementation of SAP on
the basis that it required them to do additional clerical work and it distorted the existing chain
of command within their department.
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An ERP system is a powerful
management tool..
When combined with human
intuitiveness and experiential
knowledge the capabilities of an
ERP system can enable
management to sunder core
rigidities.
An ERP system supports the
importation and dissemination of
explicit knowledge in a sanitized,
structured format.
If the routines of best practice
embedded in an ERP system do
not fit core capabilities, or the
knowledge creation activities of
operational units, they are
misaligned.

An ERP system produces a change in a
firm’s values and norms.
An ERP system places an emphasis on
explicit knowledge over tacit knowledge
by changing the perceptions and cognitive
processes of organizational actors.
The dehumanisation of knowledge
creation processes may occur with ERP
systems.
A perceived shift from implicit to explicit
knowledge may result in a perceived
devaluation of knowledge sets that were
previously prized.
Local management teams may experience
a lack of ownership over the ERP system.
The perception of ERP systems as being
user-unfriendly militates against full
acceptance and efficient use of the system.
An ERP system may become a core
rigidity and the new dominant knowledge
set.

Values and Norms

Physical Technical
Systems

Core Capabilities
Knowledge Sets
Knowledge Creating
Activities

Managerial Systems

Knowledge and
Skills
An ERP system challenges exiting tacit
knowledge and skills.
An ERP system may act as a substitute
for tacit knowledge.
In certain cases, an ERP system can
support ‘learning- by-doing.
An ERP system make provide a
corporate-wide uniform platform for the
creation of explicit knowledge and skill.
An ERP system weakens lessens the
hold that individuals or communitiesof-practice have on proprietary
knowledge sets.
Investing in an ERP system introduces
new challenges, new problems, new
ideas, new skills, and new knowledge
sets thereby invigorating the
organization’s learning process and
augmenting its knowledge asset in the
short-to-medium term.

An ERP system reduces the freedom of
local management teams to allocate
resources to develop operational firmspecific core capabilities.
The system’s drill down and reporting
capabilities changes the locus of control
over decision making and leads to the
creation of a tight centralized management
structure and a more regimented
knowledge creation process among line
managers.
An ERP system needs to be managed in a
sensitive way to accommodate firmspecific knowledge creation at operational
levels.
Benchmarking enabled by an ERP system
can inhibit innovation and the
development of management capabilities
in the long-term.

Figure 5 An Integrative Model of ERP System Implementation

Butler, Pyke

ERP Systems, Firm-Specific Knowledge and Core Capabilities

As previously stated, communities-of-practice in the Boxit organization possessed a long
held belief in the supremacy of experiential knowledge and the knowledge creating routine of
learning-by-doing. The implementation of SAP caused a change in the values and norms of
the organization in regard to the long-established primacy of tacit over explicit knowledge.
Indeed, Boxit’s CEO was famous (or infamous) for his application of tacit knowledge in
sizing up a competitor for potential takeover. However, the consensus on the importance of
tacit knowledge that had existed prior to the implementation of SAP was no long evident in
2001. Local managers were concerned that this shift to SAP’s prepackaged solutions would
ultimately dehumanize the manufacturing process and eliminate opportunities (or the
motivation) for problem solving at plant level. Without such opportunities, much-prized
problem-solving activities and core capabilities could be lost.

7. Conclusions
This study has shown that SAP can have a significant effect on an organization’s knowledge
creating capabilities. Based on this study’s findings, Figure 5 presents an integrative model
of ERP system implementation that captures the salient issues surrounding, and
consequences of, such endeavors. Briefly, the findings illustrate that the introduction of
routines of ‘best practice’ via SAP had unanticipated consequences for knowledge creating
activities at management and operational levels which challenged the knowledge sets on
which unit-specific core capabilities were based. When imaginatively applied, SAP helped
negate potential core rigidities, particularly where explicit knowledge was transferred
between manufacturing units. Nevertheless, managers and operational staff felt that SAP (a)
endangered tried and tested learning routines; (b) attenuated valuable knowledge creating
activities; (c) depleted the firm’s intangible knowledge assets; and (d) threatened established
core, enabling and supplemental capabilities. The dynamic reporting capability of SAP to
make ad hoc inquires, to drill down, and to examine managerial and operational performance
in greater detail than ever before, contributed to the creation of a rigid, centralized
management structure and further reduced the autonomy of plant managers and operational
staff. This signaled a shift in emphasis from tacit to explicit knowledge, and changed the
system of values and norms within the organization.
In conclusion, this paper argues that organizations should take extant knowledge creating
activates, such as tried and tested firm-specific routines for problem solving, organizational
learning, and decision-making into account when implementing SAP modules. Hence, senior
management must regard SAP as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Accordingly,
business and IT managers should apply SAP in a sensitive and judicious manner, rather than
be driven by its capabilities. Finally, it is clear that SAP has the potential to become the
dominant knowledge set within an organization and therefore has the potential to become a
core rigidity in itself.
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